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THE RAPID growth of corporate giving from the late 1930's to
the early 1960's was accompanied by other significant economic
changes. The period saw considerable growth in corporate revenues
and profits and a decline in the after-tax cost or "price" of a dollar in
contributions. It was also marked by related changes in corporate atti-
tudes about the legality, appropriateness, and desirability of giving. It
is the purpose of this chapter to measure, if possible, the separate
contributions of each of these developments to the observed growth.
FACTORS AFFECTING CORPORATE GIVING
In the technical language of economics the effect of the level of
corporation activity on the amount of giving 'will be described as the
scale effect. The response of giving to the "price" of contributions is
referred to as the price effect, and the effect of changing attitudes is
described as a change in the preference or taste of corporations for
giving. Problems of identifying and interpreting each of the three
effects will be discussed in turn.
A convenient measure of the scale and price effects is furnished by
the concept ofelasticity.Inthisperspective,the proportionate
change in giving is expressed as a ratio or percentage of propor-
tionate change in price or the scale of activity. If the ratio is greater
than one, then giving is said to be elastic with respect to scale or price;
i.e., it shows a more than proportionate response to changes in these
variables. If the ratio is less than one, then giving is said to be inelas-
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tic with respect to price or scale; i.e., it shows a less than proportion-
ate response. Measures of elasticity thus focus directly on the relative
degree of responsiveness rather than on absolute change. Whenever
possible, in the analysis to follow, scale and price effects will be de-
scribed in terms of elasticities.
The Scale Effect
In the theory of consumer behavior, the scale effect has been asso-
ciated with the relative income levels of persons or families. Viewed as
a form of consumption, philanthropic giving reflects the changing
composition of spending experienced by families in successively higher
income levels. Higher-income families devote a higher share of income
to certain kinds of services and commodities than do lower-income
families, and among these services are philanthropic contributions.1
Recent theoretical explorations have treated giving as an element in
the process whereby persons seek to maximize the satisfaction (or,
in economic jargon, the utility) achieved by their spending.2 In this
treatment the voluntary redistribution of income involved in giving
reflects the interdependence of individual feelings of well-being.
Knowledge that others are better off is a source of satisfaction. Giving,
in this context, represents an activity in which people achieve satis-
faction by helping to better the lot of their less fortunate neighbors.
The extension of the concept of the scale effect to corporation giv-
ing suggests that the pattern of corporate spending changes in re-
sponse to increasing size of revenues and expenditures in much the
same manner as that of families. This anthropomorphic view of the
corporation is at sharp variance with the view that the corporation is
an engine of production that arranges its inputs to production with
the of profit-maximization. It is legitimate to regard philan-
thropic contributions as an input in the profit-maximizing process, in
1Anumber of empirical studies focusing on the relationship between the level
of family income and the percentage of income "spent" on contributions have
been made. Among these are ones by F. Emerson Andrews, in the Saturday Re-
view of Literature, October 5, 1957; by C. Harry Kahn, Personal Deductions in the
Federal Income Tax (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960) pp. 73—
87; by William Vickrey, "One Economist's View of Philanthropy," in Frank G.
Dickinson, Editor, Philanthropy and Public Policy (New York: National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1962); and by Michael Taussig, "The Charitable Contri-
bution Deduction in the Federal Personal Income Tax" (Unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965), 57—65.
2See,e.g., Kenneth E. Boulding, "Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy" in
Dickinson, Philanthropy and Public Policy, pp. 67—71. Also Gary S. Becker, "InS
terdependent Preferences: Charity, Externalities, and Income Taxation" (Un-
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the sense that they may directly or indirectly benefit the corporation
and so contribute to long-run profits.
Although corporate giving is properly regarded as an input, there is
little in the theory of the corporation to suggest what amount of giv-
ing might be optimal. It will be taken as a convenient working hy-
pothesis that the size of giving, other factors taken into account, is
proportionate to the size of corporate activity, that is, the scale elas-
ticity of giving is one. This hypothesis will first be tested using ag-
gregate annual data for the period 1936 to 1963. Then, later in the
chapter, it will be tested by making cross-sectional analyses of giving
and corporate size.
The measure of the scale of corporate activity used in the historical
analysis is corporate net income after taxes. Although not wholly sat-
isfactory in a number of respects, it probably provides as useful a
measure of scale as most of the alternative measures. In scope of
coverage it is coextensive with the corporate sector. Although not so
good a measure as value added, income is highly correlated to that
measure, and value-added data are simply not available. Sales data,
for the corporate sector taken in the aggregate, are subject to serious
errors of double counting, particularly over this period when the ver-
ticalrelationshipsamong corporationshaveundergone major
changes. Finally, as pointed out in Chapter Two, both corporate and tax
laws emphasize the net-income base for contributions. On these
grounds, at least, income provides the operational measure of corpo-
rate size in the giving decision.
The Price Effect
The quantity of any input to production that is purchased by a
corporation is determined, among other things, by its relative price.
Contributions would be "purchased" ui larger quantities if their price,
relative to that of other inputs, is low, and in lesser quantities if their
price is high. There are two dimensions to the price of corporate con-
tributions. The first is associated with changes in the market prices
of the services purchased with contributions relative to factor prices
in general. The second is associated with changes in the tax rate on
corporate income and so affects the net after-tax cost of a given dol-
lar amount of contributions. Each will be examined in turn.
One can think of the contributions dollar as buying some combina-
tion of philanthropic services. With the passage of time, there may be
divergent price trends for the several kinds of services included in40 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
this "market basket" of philanthropy. If the relative quantities and
unit prices of philanthropic purchases were known, then, in princi-
ple, a price index for giving could be computed. This, in turn, could
be related to a broader index of factor prices or possibly to an even
more general price index.
The conceptual and empirical problems of devising such a price in-
dex are formidable, and in large part insoluble. For one thing, contri-
butions are most often made for activities the value of which cannot
be even approximately measured. Their value to society is felt to be
high, and so they are supported despite our inability to measure them.
Second, gifts are frequently made on the condition that they be
matched in a specified proportion by gifts from other donors. The
price to the corporation is thus lower by a factor based on the match-
ing condition, and, to the extent that the condition evokes gifts not
otherwise forthcoming, the corporation has succeeded in having more
of the service produced for its given contribution.
A third difficulty relates to the degree of benefit the corporation
feels it derives from contributions. If there has been a change in
the degree to which contributions redound to the specific benefit of
the corporation, then this may affect the company's assessment of the
"quantity" of services it is able to purchase with a dollar of contribu-
tions. It may consider directly beneficial contributions as representing
a higher "quantity" per dollar of outlay than those of less direct and
more general benefit to the company. Fourth, changes in the "tech-
nology" of producing social welfare, health, higher education, and
other services may signify lower unit prices. These are particularly
difficult to measure since such changes are often accompanied by
changes in the quality of the services. It is, therefore, difficult for the
donor to gauge thequantity equivalent of the contributions.
The index number problem is further complicated when there are
significant changes over time in the relative quantitites of the services
in the market basket purchased by corporate contributions. Such
changes have evidently taken place (Table 9). The record for the
period beginning in 1936 is not available, but that for the eighteen-
year period from 1947 to 1965 suggests that the corporate donations
market basket has shifted increasingly to higher education and away
from health and welfare.
To summarize, the value to the corporation of its purchases of phil-
anthropic services is likely to be hard to measure. Contributions may
return a benefit to the corporation only after a delay in time andEconomic Analysis of Corporate Giving 41




Health and welfare 66.650.745.140.941.5
(federated drives) (37.9) (21.9) (25.1) (25.5) (24.2)
Education 13.431.339.141.938.4




Number of companies reporting 71 180280465 540
Total contributions (millions):
Reporting companies $16.1$38.3$98.6 $154.1 $209.3
All corporations 241415482 595n,a.
Reporting companies as
percentage of all 6.7 9.220.525.9n.a.
NOTE: More detailed breakdowns are presented in Appendix F.
SOURCE: Reporting Companies: National Industrial Conference Board: 1947: The Business
Record, January, 1950, pp. 18—19; 1955: Company Contributions, Studies In Business
Policy, No. 89, 1958, p. 11; 1959: The Business Record, June, 1961, p. 12; 1962: Business
Management Record, October, 1963, p. 25; 1965: The Conference Board Record, October,
1966, p. 45. All Corporations: U.S. Treasury Department Statistics of Income, Corporation
Income Tax Returns.
often only in a very general way. For example, contributions to higher
education will result in a more highly trained labor force only after a
lag of some years. Further, the corporation may directly benefit only
to the degree that it succeeds in attracting the trained personnel it
had a part in educating. Indeed, a recurring theme in the literature of
corporate philanthropy is that, while the return to the corporation
from its support of "general welfare" projects cannot be precisely
measured or directly assigned, it could be substantial. By aiding sci-
entific research, the solution of social problems, or the elevation of
cultural levels, the corporation may help to produce an environment
which, in a variety of ways, is congenial to its survival and prosperity.
This brings us to the second dimension to the price of corporate
contributions, the significance of tax deductibility. Because contribu-
tions are most validly classed among those expenditures whose re-
turns are deferred, uncertain, and only roughly measurable, they are
more closely related to spending on, say, institutional advertising or
basic research than to spending on labor, material, machinery, or
direct advertising and sales campaigns. As a result, the corporate in-
come tax rate is likely to have much greater impact on decisions about
the size of contributions budgets than considerations of a price index42 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
for contributions. The longer deferred and more uncertain the return
from expenditures for contributions, the more important is likely to
be the immediate and certain tax saving that accompanies such ex-
penditures, and the greater the weight given to their net after-tax
cost.
Tax deductibility, therefore, is that aspect of the price of contribu-
tions included in the analysis. The price variable is defined as the net
after-tax cost of a given dollar amount of contributions. For simplicity
this will usually be expressed as the after-tax cost of one dollar in
contributions. This is the same as the complement of the marginal tax
rate expressed in percentage form.
The "price" of giving, so defined, is not the same for all corpora-
tions, since corporations may fall into income classes that place them
in one of several marginal tax-rate brackets. The $495 million in cor-
porate contributions for 1953, for example, was made by corporations
paying one of four separate "prices" for their contributions. For com-
panies with negative net income (or net loss) for the year, the price
of $1.00 in contributions was $1.00, their marginal tax rate being
zero.3 For profitable corporations having less than $25,000 in net in-
come, the price was $0.70, their marginal tax rate being 30 per cent.
For those having more than $25,000 in net income but not subject to
the excess-profits tax, the price was $0.48, and for those subject to the
excess-profits tax it was $0.18.
Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service tabulations do not
present data on gifts and contributions by income classes and so one
cannot know how many dollars of contributions were made at each of
the severa' "prices." For this reason it is not possible to compute a
precise measure of the average "price" of contributions. A rough
measure of the downward trend in "price" over this period of rising
tax rates is presented in Table 10 below; the construction of this
measure and an evaluation of assumptions and biases are described
in Appendix Table VII. For most years the average "price" is the com-
plement of the ordinary corporate income tax rate, as this is the
"price" faced by corporations that accounted for the preponderance
of corporate net income and contributions. In ten of the twenty-eight
years some—but probably not complete—account is taken of the fact
that a large part of corporate net income was earned by corporations
aTheprice would be $1.00 for many corporations only through 1954. After
1954, a contributions deduction greater than 5 per cent of income could be
carried forward for two years, to be offset against income in those years. Thus,
only if a corporation had losses for three consecutive years would the "price" be
100 per cent of the contribution.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 43
subject to the excess-profits tax, and who thereby faced a much lower
"price" of giving.
Beginning in the late 1930's, when the "price" of $1.00 in contribu-
tion was first 85 cents and then 81 cents for most contributions, the
"price" has shown a strong downward trend. The trend has not been
a regular one, however. In the six excess-profits tax years spanning
World War II, the "price" was sharply lower, reaching a low point of
28 cents in 1943. This period was followed by. a four-year plateau in
corporate income tax rates, during which the "price" of most contri-
butions was 62 cents. The four excess-profits tax years spanning the
Korean War produced a second sharp dip in the "price" of contribu-
tions. This then was followed by a ten-year plateau in corporate
tax rates, from 1954 through 1963, during which the "price" of most
contributions was 48 cents.4
This pattern may make it difficult to separate the price effect from
the effect of the time trend in the preference for giving. It is possible
that the rise in giving as a percentage of income, as described in
Chapter Two, was in part the result of a ratchet process. In this proc-
ess, the stimulus to giving produced by high excess-profits tax rates
may have led corporations to make larger commitments to donees—
commitments, which, once tax rates were lowered,, were hard to re-
duce, but which were less burdensome to maintain than would have
been the case had the "price" been restored to its pre-excess-profits tax
level. If so, then what may appear to have been the pure effect of an
upward trend in tastes may in reality have been partly a price effect.
One may perhaps take comfort from the fact that the role of price in
the development of tastes is a ubiquitous one, and so the problem is
not unique to philanthropic contributions.
The Trend in Tastes and Other
Influences on Giving
As mentioned in Chapter Two, there appears to have been a consid-
erable liberalization over the period in corporate attitudes toward the
'Technically, some of the contributions made during 1963 were made at a
higher "price," as corporation income tax rates were reduced effective January 1,
1964. However, only a small part of corporate net income was reported by cor-
porations whose accounting year ended after December 31, 1963, i.e., between
January 1, and June 30, 1964. The Statistics of Income for 1963 included all cor-
porations whose accounting year ended between July 1, 1963 and June 30, 1964.
In addition, since the tax rate was, in effect, an average based on the number of
days the company operated under the old higher and new lower tax rates, the
"price" change for any given corporation could only have been very minor, at
most half of the 2 per cent increase for corporations whose accounting year
ended June 30, 1964.44 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
legality, appropriateness, and desirability of giving. Precise measures
of the effects of this change on corporate behavior do not exist. How-
ever, the subject has received sufficient attention and discussion to
warrant an attempt to determine whether it has made a significant
difference in giving levels.
Affecting any inclination toward philanthropic giving on the part
of corporation management is its awareness of the legal right of cor-
porations to make contributions. Liberalization of this legal right in
all likelihood reflected successful efforts by a number of corporations
whose attitudes toward giving had changed. This in turn led to a more
general corporate awareness of this right, which then may have
played an expanded role in what we have chosen to call a change
in preference or taste for giving.
Before 1936, common law precedents were few and presented little
clear guidance whether or to what a corporation might make dana-
Specific state laws permitting corporations to make contribu-
tions did give explicit recognition to the right, but, before 1935, only
seven states had enacted such laws. The Federal Revenue Act of 1935,
which permitted deduction of contributions up. to 5 per cent of in-
come, probably gave support to a broader interpretation of existing
state laws by designating contributions as a category of tax-deductible
outlay separate and distinct from business expenses.°
As of 1940, only nine states had permissive legislation, the main
pressure toward greater state permissiveness coming with World War
II. By 1952 statutes permitting corporate giving had been enacted in
29 states and Hawaii,7 and by 1959 this number had grown to 41.8
Liberalizationof state laws was accompanied by more permissive
interpretation by courts. Probably the most significant decision in this
respect was that rendered in the case of a manufacturing company
which made a $1 ,500-gift to Princeton University. In finding in favor
of the corporation, and against the shareholders who had brought
suit, the decision held that the boards of corporations may contribute
for purposes which, in their judgment:
Will conduce to the betterment of social and economic conditions,
thereby permitting such corporations, as creatures of the State, to dis-
F. Emerson Andrews, Corporation Giving (New York: Russell Sage Founda-
tion, 1952), pp. 229—233.
°Ibid.,pp. 233—239.
7lbid.
°BertS. Prunty, Jr., "Love and the Corporation," Virginia Law Review, April,
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charge their obligations to society while, at the same time, reaping the
benefits which essentially accrue to them through public recognition
of their existence within the economic and social, as well as within the
legal, structure of society.9
To measure the effects of attitudinal change as separate from,
though partly determined by, change in legal status, one ideally ought
to have an independent and direct measure of attitudes, over time,
and comparable from one period to the next. Unfortunately no data
exist that would permit the construction of such a series. While the
literature does not lend itself to the quantification of an index of taste
or preference, a sampling might suggest something of the direction it
has taken.
The general trend in corporate attitudes is summed up by the 1952
testimony of Frank W. Abrams, former Chairman of the Board of
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), in the A. P. Smith Case:
During the forty years of my business career, I have observed a
slow but steady transition in the attitude of corporate management
from one of more or less exclusive preoccupation with self-interest to
one of self-interest tempered with a broadening sense of social con-
sciousness.
This more general attitude has been refined by a number of persons,
perhaps most notably by W. Homer Turner, Executive Director of the
United States Steel Foundation, and by Richard Eells. In a 1961 state-
ment, Eells, who has written widely on the social and political ra-
tionale of corporate giving, made the case as follows:
Every company—large or small—has an obligation to its share-
holders, and to all the other interests it is bound to protect. Therefore
it should use its support program as an instrument of corporate survi-
val in a free society.... Themajor function of corporate giving ... is
to vitalize the defenses of a free society by active support of those pri-
vate sectors that invigorate freedom.1°
A more contemporary statement, reflecting the further develop-
ment and enlargement of corporate attitudes is that by Dr. Frank
Stanton, President of Columbia Broadcasting System, in Feburary,
1967, before the Arts Council of Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Stanton pointed
to the sharply increased corporate support of higher education as in-
°A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. & Barlow, et a!. 26 New Jersey Super. 106 (1953).
10TheChanging Role of American Corporate Phi'anthropy, Report on Mid-
west Public Relations Conference, University of Wisconsin, October 10, 1961
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), p. 16.46 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
dicative of business' "broadened horizons and increased awareness
[of the fact that] business is learning, along with every other sector
of society...thatit both nourishes and is nourished by all those other
activities that give any society character, richness, variety and mean-
ing." He asked whether the arts might not be "ultimately the meeting
ground where liberal education and progressive business come to-
gether." Feeling that the arts might be the first place in which the
vitality of individualism might be lost, he suggested that, "if this were
to happen, no liberal education will save our kind of society and no
business enterprise will long endure in what is left of it."
The liberalization of corporate attitudes toward giving, and its ac-
ceptance as a legitimate corporate function, is reflected in formalized
policy-making and administration by increasing numbers of com-
panies. Referring to his National Industrial Conference Board surveys
of corporation giving patterns, John H. Watson III reported:
In 1955, it was difficult to locate as many as 15 company policy
statements on contributions during a nation-wide survey. During a
1965 statistical survey, however, copies of 45 policies were submitted
to the Board without special request.
Today, between one-fourth and one-third of those companies having
contribution programs have also established contribution committees,
and therebytiein contribution objectives with overall company
goals.
The staff concerned, on a full-time basis, with the giving function
is now larger than ever before. One-third of the 55 members on The
Conference Board's Council of Executives on Company Contributions
today spends a majority or virtually all of their time on the function.
And among the larger companies represented in NICB surveys, two-
thirds use a contribution budget.11
Finally, mention should be made of less obvious, but nonetheless
significant, pressures to contribute that have been brought to bear
upon executives. One observer has identified two principal kinds; the
first is described as "executive backscratching," and the second as
pressures from government, particularly in the 1960's. He doubts,
however, that companies often respond to such importuning if they
do not see the social value of the suggested projects.
An attempt was made to measure the effect of attitudes toward
giving through the use of a proxy variable. This variable was simply
a series of successive integers from 1 through 28, assigned to the suc-
""Recent Company Contribution Trends," The Conference Board Record,
National Industrial Conference Board, January, 1968, p. 4.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 47
cessive years of the period, 1936 having a value of 1; 1963, a value of
28. Technically, this variable is a proxy for the effects of all long-run
changes other than those specifically included in the analysis. Tastes
are presumably, but not certainly, the most important of these other
changes. If there were any other developments that took place in a
relatively persistent and progressive pattern over the period, the trend
variable would serve as a proxy for them also. Although no other such
developments are apparent, it should be kept in mind that the trend
variable may measure the influence of factors as yet unrecognized.
Anticipation of Tax Rate Changes
An additional explanatory variable was included in the analysis.
This was a number that reflected the expectation that an excess-
profits tax would be either enacted or repealed in the following year.
If it were widely anticipated that this tax would be enacted, bringing
with it a sharp reduction in the net after.tax cost of giving, corpora-
tions might defer gifts planned for the current year, give more the
following year, and thus enjoy a reduction, over-all, in the after-tax
cost of their giving. On the other hand, if a repeal of the excess-profits
tax were widely anticipated, then corporations might move next
year's planned giving ahead into the current year, while the cost of
giving was still low. As will be shown in Chapter Four, the existence of
company-sponsored foundations probably facilitated such responses.
Serving as reservoirs into which contributions could be poured or
from which they could be drained, these foundations made it possible
for corporations to maintain a more uniform flow of contributions to
their ultimate beneficiaries, while taking advantage of tax-savings in
the timing of their deductions for contributions.
Inspection of the time series of corporate contributions suggests
that this pattern of behavior took place. The excess-profits tax rate
was sharply increased in 1940, and gifts from corporations with
profits increased from $29 million in 1939 to $37 million in 1940.
The tax was repealed in 1946, and gifts dropped from an unusually
high 1945 total of $263 million to an unusually low 1946 total of $211
million. This came after seven successive annual increases since
1938. In 1947 gifts rose again to $238 million, a level more in line
with their secular growth pattern. An excess-profits tax was again
imposed in 1950, and gifts rose from an unusually low level of $220
million in 1949 to $250 million in 1950. The tax was repealed in
1954, and gifts dropped from an extremely high $491 million in 195348 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
to a very low $309 million in 1954. They returned to $410 million in
1955, slightly above their 1952 level of $396 million.
In the time-series analysis, the tax-change anticipations effect is
measured through the use of a proxy variable (Table 10). The var-
iable is assigned a value of one in all years except those adjacent to
the enactment or repeal of the excess-profits tax. The variable was as-
signed a value of zero for the year preceding an enactment or follow-
ing a repeal of the tax. It was assigned a value of two for the first year
the tax was in effect after enactment and the last year it was in effect
before its repeal. Although this treatment was rather crude, it was felt
that, for present purposes, little would be gained from a more elab-
orate treatment.
The effect of expectations about the excess-profits tax probably
should be regarded mainly as an irregular factor, unrelated to the
longer-run forces making for permanent changes in the level of giv-
ing. The variable was included in the analysis principally to discount
its influence, in order to measure the effects of the other variables
more precisely.
The Profitability Effect
A corporation's disposition to make contributions is associated not
only with the quantity of profits from which contributions might be
drawn, but also with the rate of return on shareholders' investment,
i.e., profits as a percentage of the corporation's net worth. The higher
the profit rate, with all other factors equal, the more disposed will be
the corporation's managers toward distributing a larger-than-normal
share of profits to philanthropy. The converse applies for low profit
rates. Profit rates move with the level or scale of profits, and so one
would expect to find measured scale and profitability effects to be
fairly similar in value. However, because shareholders' investment
also changes over time, a given movement in profitability is not ex-
actly proportional to that in profits. The difference in movements re-
fleet the profitability effect.
To isolate the effect of profitability on contributions, net worth was
included as a separate variable in the analysis. This was done in pref-
erence to using the ratio of profits to net worth as an explicit profit-
ability variable.12 Movements in net income, holding net worth con-
An important reason for adopting this treatment was to avoid the high in-
tercorrelation which would exist between the profits (or scale) variable and the
profitability variable, the latter being a fraction with profits as its numerator. This
intercorrelation would complicate the interpretation of the regressions.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 49
stant, represent like movements in the rate of return on investment.
Therefore, the coefficient of the income variable, in equations also
containing the net-worth variable, measures the response of contribu-
tions to changes in the rate of profit.
The net-worth variable used in the analysis was that for all net-
income corporations as presented in Statistics of Income. It is on a
book-value basis since it is derived from the balance sheet data pro-
vided on corporation income tax returns, and reflects the accounting
conventions applied in determining income subject to tax. These data
were deflated by the implicit price deflator for the gross national prod-
uct, as were the contributions and income data. As will be seen below,
the net-worth data have shortcomings which may seriously limit the
significance of findings based on their use, although the biases are
capable of at least crude evaluation.
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
Table 10 summarizes the aforementioned variables chosen to an-
alyze the movement in contributions, and presents the annual data
on which the analysis is based. The techniques of multiple regression
analysis were used to describe the several relationships. In addition to
relating contributions to the income (scale), price, trend, tax-change
expectations, and profitability of the current year, they were also re-
lated to income (scale) and price of the preceding year. It was found
that the current-year-only regressions contained significant levels of
serial correlation, which were reduced to nonsignificant levels by the
introduction of lagged price and income. The combined effects of
current- and preceding-year price or income, keeping in mind their
intercorrelations, could be interpreted as elasticities.13
The regressions were run in sequence, beginning with one explana-
tory variable and successively adding additional explanatory vari-
ables. Attention was focused on those changes in regression coeffi-
cients which helped to determine whether the coefficient measured
only the relationship between giving and the variable in question or
whether the variable indirectly reflected the effect of other variables
with which it was correlated. The variables, with the exception of
Theinclusion of the lagged income and price variables meant that the re-
gression analysis was based on 27 instead of 28 observations, the current-year
data for 1936 being omitted. Although data for 1964 has become available since
the 1936—1963 regressions were run, it was decided, because of time factors, not
to recompute the regressions to include 1964 data. As will be shown below, it is
doubtful that the addition of these data would have changed the results in any
significant way.50 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
TABLE10Contributions of Net-Income Corporations and Related Economic
Variables Used to Explain Their Behavior, 1936—1963
(Dollar values in millions of 1936 dollars)
NetIncome
After Taxes, Expec-
Gifts and Before "Price" of tation
Contri- Gifts and$1 in Con- of Tax Net
Year butionsContributions tributionsTrend ChangeWorth
1936 $ 27.0 $8,594 $0.850 1 1 $111,338
1937 27.8 8,288 0.850 2 1 108,351
1938 22.4 5,765 0.810 3 1 96,842
1939 28.7 7,772 0.810 4 0 109,039
1940 36.0 8,696 0.585 5 2 113,066
1941 51.6 10,162 0.322 6 1 115,542
1942 77.4 9,820 0.323 7 1 105,707
1943 118.8 9,927 0.283 8 1 104,733
1944 170.9 9,269 0.290 9 1 106,346
1945 188.1 8,410 0.336 10 2 103,404
1946 135,1 12,038 0.620 11 0 95,157
1947 136.2 13,145 0.620 12 1 97,074
1948 126.6 13,377 0.620 13 1 101,140
1949 118.8 11,531 0.620 14 2 105,397
1950 133.1 14,675 0.398 15 2 114,864
1951 170.1 12,088 0.327 16 1 114,402
1952 193.3 10,900 0.355 17 1 117,116
1953 237.4 11,162 0.360 18 2 120,285
1954 147.3 11,425 0.480 19 0 120,556
1955 192.6 14,188 0.480 20 1 133,970
1956 187.6 13,860 0.480 21 1 138,293
1957 180.5 13,081 0.480 22 1 135,700
1958 163.5 11,353 0.480 23 1 140,757
1959 198.4 13,174 0.480 24 1 149,103
1960 196.4 12,779 0.480 25 1 151,792
1961 206.1 13,479 0.480 26 1 158,868
1962 238.4 14,613 0.480 27 1 167,665
1963 259.6 15,758 0.480 28 1 175,725
trendand tax-change expectations, were expressed in logarithmic
form so the regression coefficients could be directly read as measures
of elasticity. The sequences of equations and tables of simple correla-
tions among the several variables are presented in Appendix C.
The equations selected as most clearly significant are presented in
Table 11. As mentioned above, income and price for both the current
and preceding year were included among the explanatory variables.
The equations in Appendix C show that the current year's income gen-
erally had much more significant regression coefficients than did the
income of the preceding year. Because of the high correlation between
the two measures, only current-year income was included as the in-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































652 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
contrast, the preceding-year's price was found to have much more sig-
nificant regression coefficients than current-year price and, again be-
cause of the high intercorrelation, only it was included. For purposes
of comparison, equations including both current and lagged income
and price variables are also presented.
Scale and Profitability Elasticities
Table 11 tends to confirm the expectation that the scale elasticity
of giving has a value close to unity. In the first equation the elasticity
of giving with respect to the current-year's income was + 1.05. Al-
though the second equation yields an elasticity of +0.81, there is
some reason to believe that it is understated. Because the second equa-
tion includes net worth as a separate variable, the regression coeffi-
cient for the income variable measures the effect of profitability in-
stead of the pure effect of income or scale. Income and net worth
move together, and the intercorrelation is high enough (r =+.6)
so that some of the purely scale effects may have been reflected in
the coefficient of the net-worth variable.
On somewhat different grounds, the net-worth effect may be over-
stated (and the scale effect understated) because errors in the net-worth
measure probably lead to an understatement of its true variability.14
This produces a higher measure of net-worth elasticity and a cor-
respondingly lower measure of income elasticity.15 It is of interest to
note that the observed income elasticity (+0.81) is about as far be-
low unity as the net-worth elasticity (—1.20) is above unity. One
can only speculate about how much closer together these might be
brought if a more adequate measure of net worth had been available.
The negative sign of the net-worth coefficient is what one would ex-
14Reasonsfor the understatement are related to change in the accounting
treatment of corporate assets over the period and to the use of the gross national
product implicit deflator to put the net -worth data on a constant-dollar basis. The
basic net-worth data are those contained in the United States Internal Revenue
Service's Statisticsof Income.They are on a book-value basis and, over the period,
probably increasingly reflect historical cost valuation. Inventory valuation has in-
creasingly reflected the wider use of Last In—First Out cost accounting, and depre-
ciation policies have increasingly emphasized accelerated depreciation patterns.
The use of a price deflator based on current-year product prices, when applied to
asset data containing fixed assets of varying ages and costs of acquisition, prob-
ably leads to overdeflation. Both biases lead to an understatement of the growth
and variability of the net-worth series.
15Fora discussion of the statistical basis for this evaluation of effects of bias,
see Mordecai Ezekiel and Karl Fox, Methods of Correlation and Regression Anal-
ysis, 3rd edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), pp. 311—317.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 53
pect. That is, the larger the shareholders' investment, net income being
held constant, the lower the rate of return and the lower the giving
rate.
The scale variant equation, containing both current- and preceding-
year income, also suggests that the scale elasticity is close to unity.
Although the two regression coefficients add to considerably more
than unity (1.43), when the relatively high intercorrelation (r =
+.77)is considered, the "net" scale effect is well below the total. In
summary, the findings suggest that, when other factors are taken into
account, the growth in the scale of corporate activity as reflected by
income has tended to increase giving in the same proportion. For an
explanation of the rise in the ratio of giving to income over the period,
the effects of other factors will have to be examined.
Examination of the income coefficients in two equations in the
profitability variant of the analysis suggests a profitability elasticity
of less than unity. However, as mentioned above, it is difficult to sep-
arate profitability from scale effects; this problem is compounded by
deficiencies in data, particularly in the net-worth variable. Differ-
ences in regression coefficients for the income variable between the
scale and profitability variants might be taken as reflecting the profit-
ability effect. These differences suggest that the effect is not large.
Perhaps a low profitability effect is what one might expect. Corpo-
rations might regard periods of high or low profit rates as basically
temporary departures from their normal or long-run rates, and giving
might be related more to the long-run than to the current rate. It could
likewise be argued that giving might be related more to the long-run
than to the current absolute amount of net income. However, corpo-
rate decisions might be more directly affected by the amount of profits
presently available for distribution than by the rate of return on in-
vestment that these profits signified. This would be the case, for exam-
ple, in corporations that have adopted a policy of giving a more or less
constant percentage of profits. Such rule-of-thumb calculations may
be fairly important, if not explicitly stated, in many corporate-giving
decisions.
Price Elasticity
The regressions indicate that giving responded to changes in the
marginal tax rate (complement), which affected the immediate
after-tax cost or "price" of making gifts. Moreover, the response ap-54 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
peared to be proportionate to the relative change in price, the elas-
ticity coefficients having values ranging near —1.0. As shown in
Appendix Table XI, price elasticity measures were only slightly af-
fected by the addition of explanatory variables other than price, sug-
gesting that the coefficients were fairly pure measures of the price
effect. Moreover, taken separately, the two price coefficients exhibited
very high degrees of statistical significance.
What was unexpected in the analysis of the price effect was the
very significant relationship found between giving in one year and the
price in the preceding year. Also unexpected was the degree to which
the introduction of preceding-year price reduced the effect of current-
year price. As mentioned above, each measure of price, taken sep-
arately, showed an elasticity of close to —1.0, and was statistically
significant. However, when both price measures were included in the
regression, the elasticity coefficient for the current-year's price fell to
a low value, was as often positive as negative, and, in all cases, was
not statistically significant. By contrast, the elasticity coefficient for
the preceding-year's price retained a value near —1.0, and in all cases
remained highly significant.1°
The greater significance of preceding-year over current-year price
regressions may in part reflect the introduction of the tax-change ex-
pectations variable into the analysis. As one would expect, the four
episodic movements in tax-change expectations were accompanied
by large concurrent (and opposite) changes in price. The. expecta-
tions variable was thus more highly correlated with current-year price
(r =—.373)than with preceding-year price (r =—.034).The cur-
rent-year price variable in equations also containing the preceding-
year price variable had positive regression coefficients only when the
expectations variable was included in the equation.17
This pattern may be seen in Table 11. In the scale variant equa-
tion, which contains the tax-change expectation variable, the current-
year price regression coefficient is positive (+.34). In the profitability
variant equation, which does not contain the tax-change expectations
variable, the current-year price coefficient is negative (—.28). In
16Oneother effect of the inclusion of preceding-year price in the regression
was to remove the serial correlation present in all of the regressions in which
this variable was not included.
This statement is based on those equations which demonstrated no signifi-
cant degree of serial correlation at the 5 per cent level of significance (see Ap-
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both equations the coefficients of the current- and preceding-year
price variables add to a negative value slightly below one.
The precise mechanism by which the price effect results from the
joint operation of current- and preceding-year prices evades simple
explanation, and the correlation analysis is too broad to describe the
pattern of this process. The broad findings, however, do suggest a
price elasticity of giving somewhere near minus one. In this, the find-
ings are in general accord with what the earlier discussion implied
about this price elasticity.
To summarize, like other inputs to production, the quantity of
contributions purchased is determined by the benefits that the corpo-
ration feels it derives from them. However, the projection of the re-
turn from philanthropic outlays is especially subject to problems of
fUturity and uncertainty, and so the immediate and certain tax savings
that accompany contributions are likely to weigh more heavily in the
decision. The observed elasticity coefficients suggest that tax savings
have, in fact, weighed heavily in decisions to give.
Expectations of Changes in
Excess-Profits Taxes
The variable depicting expectations of changes in the excess-profits
tax shows a positive and statistically significant effect on gifts and
contributions. As shown above in Table 10, the values given in this
variable are arbitrary. They do not attempt to describe the intensity
or consensus of expectations, which may have varied from one war-
time period to another. Nonetheless, this variable was found to have
some separate significance, which would seem to justify its inclusion
in the analysis. Moreover, despite the possibility that this variable has
made it more difficult to isolate current- and preceding-year price ef-
fects, it probably has led to less ambiguous measures of the income,
price, and trend effects.
Trend in Tastes and Other Influences
on Giving
The separate effect of progressive changes in "other" factors, as re-
flected by the trend variable, was found to be substantial and statisti-
cally significant. There were, of course, high positive correlations of
the trend variable with the giving, income, and net-worth variables,
and a moderate negative correlation with the price variable. However,56 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
in the multiple regression equations, where the net effects of each var-
iable were separately measured, the trend variable exhibited con-
sistently high and significant values. This indicates that the passage
of time, and the developments associated with it other than those
mentioned above, made an important independent contribution to
the growth in giving.
The regression equations in which the net effect of the trend are
most clearly measured are those showing the least evidence of serial
correlation. The eight equations having nonsignificant Von Neumann
ratios (5-per-cent level of significance) are presented in Appendix
Table XII. The T-ratio for the trend variable for these equations in all
cases was statistically significant, ranging in value from 3,32 to 9.99.
The compound annual percentage rate of growth indicated by the re-
gression coefficient ranged from 2.8 per cent to 8.1 per cent, with a
median value of 5.7 per cent.18 This suggests that, over the twenty-
seven-year period, factors other than income and price were respon-
sible for a more than 300 per cent increase in gifts and contributions.
These findings lend support to the argument that changes in cor-
porate attitudes toward giving played a major role in its growth over
the period, The attitude changes reflected in the statements of
corporate officials cited above on pages 44 through 47 apparently repre-
sented much more than lip service to worthy goals. Such stated atti-
tudes, progressively more receptive to notions of the legality, desirabil-
ity, and appropriateness of giving, appear to have been accompanied
by an equally strong change in corporate behavior.19
While attitudinal change may have been a major proximate cause
of the growth in giving, it, in turn, may have reflected a number of in-
direct developments that showed progressive change over the period.
Some of these developments, particularly of a legal and social nature,
have been mentioned above. Another one that comes to mind is the
increased governmental support of public higher education, which
18Aspresented in Appendix Table XII, the regression coefficients of the trend
variable ranged in value from .012 to .034. The coefficient represents the year-to-
year change in the logarithmofgiving, other variables held constant. Ex-
pressed as antilogs, the coefficient is thus equivalent to the ratio of giving in a
particular year to that in the preceding year. This ratio is the same as one plus
the annual compound growth rate expressed in decimal form.
Acomparison of the findings of this time-series analysis with one conducted
independently by another researcher is presented in Appendix E. Both are based
on essentially the same data and method, but with significant differences in data
treatment. The comparison reveals more fully the reasons the particular data
treatment here adopted produces less ambiguous measures of the effects being
examined.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 57
TABLE121963 to 1964 Change in Contributions, Corporate Income,
and Price, Corporations with Net Income
(Dollar values in millions of 1936 dollars)
Percentage
1963 1964 Change
Gifts and contributions $259.6 $283.5 +9.2
Net income after taxes, before
gifts and contributions 15,758 18,103 +14.9
Net after-tax cost or "price"
of $1 in contributions 0.48 0.50 +4.2
may have had an indirect effect on the increased corporate support
of private colleges and universities. Certainly, the argument that pri-
vate higher education must remain strong to provide balance, inno-
vation, and variety in higher education, in the face of rapidly expand-
ing public programs, has figured prominently in fund-raising appeals.
Changes from 1963 to 1964
As mentioned above in note 13, data on 1964 corporate giving, in-
come, and tax rates became available shortly before the final edi-
torial revisions were made in the text and well after the regression
analysis had been made. It was possible to include the 1964 data in
the descriptive sections of the study, and in the statistical appendixes,
but not in the regressions.
To determine whether the inclusion of 1964 data in the regres-
sions would have materially changed them, comparisons of 1964 to
1963 variables are presented in Table 12. The percentage change in
gifts and contributions (+9.2) is somewhat less than the combined
effect of scale (income) and price, which, if elasticities of, respec-
tively, plus-one and minus-one are assumed, would predict an in-
crease in gifts and contributions of 10.1 per cent.20
One reason for the lower realized increase in gifts and contribu-
tions may have been expectations of the tax reduction in 1964. This
may have led some corporations to move some of their giving ahead
into 1963, thus making for a lower 1963—1964 increase. However, the
"price" change was not large. In any event the 1963—1964 patterns of
change are sufficiently close to those described by the 1936—1963 re-
gressions to reassure one that, were 1964 data included in the regres-
20Thisis the product of the percentage change in income and price, computed
as follows (1 +.149) x (1 —.042) which equals 1.101 or, in percentage terms, 100
per cent plus 10.1 per cent.58 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
sions, the findings would have been substantially the same as those
presented in Table 11.
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
The cross-sectional examination of corporate data was made to il-
luminate influences on corporate contributions that are not directly
measurable in time-series analysis. These include the relationship be-
tween giving and such things as the size of corporations, their indi-
vidual profitability, and the degree of capital- or labor-intensive pro-
duction. Not measurable were the effects of such time-related factors
as changes in tax rates ("price") and in the propensity to give.
As in the time-series analysis, the technique of multiple correlation
was employed. Data were assembled for 121 industry classes in man-
ufacturing, as presented by the Internal Revenue Service in the
Source Book for its Statistics of Income.2' The financial statements
for 1954—1957 were combined to minimize the distortion contained
in data for only one year. The period spans virtually the whole busi-
ness cycle that had its initial trough in August, 1954, its peak in July,
1957, and its final trough in April, 1958.22 As the contributions,
profits, dividends, etc. of the several industries are affected in differ-
ent degrees through the cycle, a full cycle was used to minimize what,
for present purposes, would be spurious variation in the data.
The analysis was limited to the relatively homogeneous manufac-
turing sector because it was felt that intersectoral differences might
obscure the effects of the variables examined if the other industhal
sectors were covered. Not only were the corporations in the man-
ufacturing sector somewhat alike with respect to their production
operations, but there was a large enough number of industries (121)
on which to base the statistical analysis.
Some notion of the variety among sectors is given in Table 13. Here
it can be seen, first, that there was a large variation in the size of
corporations (as roughly measured by average annual income). Aver-
age annual income ranged from $5 thousand for corporations in the
service industries to $182 million for those in manufacturing. In addi-
The Source Book contains balance sheets and income statements for more
detailed industry categories than those published in the Statistics of Income. The
Source Book was generously made available to the National Bureau by the In-
ternal Revenue Service.
More exactly, the period includes the four returns filed by corporations hav-
ing tax years ending on July 1, 1954, through June 30, 1958. As calendar-year
filing is the most common period adopted by corporations, it is both substantially





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.60 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
tion, there was great variation in the percentage of income distributed
as gifts and contributions. Measured relative to after-tax income, this
percentage ranged from 0.68 per cent for the finance, insurance, and
real estate sector to 3.40 per cent for construction.23
The basic data used in the correlation analysis were first converted
to logarithmic form. This was done so that the calculated relation-
ships between giving and the several explanatory variables could be
interpreted as measures of elasticity. Estimating equations containing
from one to six independent variables were computed (see Table
14).24Table14 includes the T-ratios of the regression coefficients so
that the statistical significance of each variable may be assessed. The
relationship of each variable to contributions will be discussed in turn.
Corporate Size
An aspect of corporate giving that has received some attention is
the broad empirical finding that, as corporate size increases, the per-
centage of income given declines. The pattern was described for 1948
by F. Emerson Andrews, who offered the following rather striking
comparison: "The 601 giant corporations [over $100 million in as-
sets] appear to have given in 1948 only one-quarter as much of their
profits as the half million corporations with assets below $1 mil-
lion."25 A parallel tabulation for 1957 reveals much the same relation-
ship (Column 7 in Table 15). Taken at face value, these findings im-
ply that the largest corporations are less generous, relative to their
income available for giving, than are the small ones.
This finding is particularly surprising in the light of what is known
The meaning of the income measure itself is subject to interpretation. As
wifi be shown later in detail, the accounting measure of income as provided in
corporate income tax returns may not be fully equivalent to the return to in-
vested capital as usually conceived. For example, some of this return may be
found in the compensation of the company's officers, whose salaries may contain
elements of return on capital. When contributions are related to distributions of
income, under the alternative assumptions that officers' compensation is or is not
a distribution of income (rather than a payment for labor services), the ratios
of contributions to income for the seven major sectors are significantly re-
ordered (Table 13).
Ofthe six explanatory variables used in the multiple correlation, five were
taken from the Source Book for Statistics of Income, cited above. One, employ-
ment, is derived from the periodic Census of Manufactures, and so is available
for 1954 only; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1954, Volume
I: Summary Statistics, Chapter IV, pp. 204—1 through 204—23. The matrix of sim-
ple correlation coefficients underlying Table 14 is presented in Appendix D. A
seventh variable, net income after taxes, was originally included in the analysis.
It was not included in Table 14 because, in the cross-sectional data in which tax
rates were substantially equal for all corporations, itwas very highly correlated
with before-tax income.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 63
about the attitudes toward giving expressed by the leaders of large
corporations, some of whom were cited above. Certainly, it runs con-
trary to the widely held belief that the large corporations have been in
the vanguard of the liberalization in corporate thinking and behavior
in giving. For these reasons and others, the statistical bases of these
comparisons were examined in some detail.
One source of bias in the comparison is that the understatement of
corporate income may be systematically greater the smaller the com-
pany. This bias in income data has been treated more fully else-
where.26 In brief, it arises from the inclusion of a return on invested
capital in the compensation of the corporation's officers and exec-
utives, as well as the salary received for services. The smaller the cor-
poration, the more common it is for its officers to own all or most of
the company's stock, and the greater the latitude of these officers in
deciding the form of their own compensation. Where both corporate
and individual income taxes are involved, there may be significant tax
savings if earnings on capital are in the form of salary rather than
dividends.
To illustrate the effect of this bias, contributions have been ex-
pressed as a percentage of corporate income more broadly defined.
Variously included in the two new definitions here presented are offi-
cers compensation, and other income components such as dividend
payments, retained earnings, and contributions (Table 15, Columns
8 and 9). On both definitions of income, the percentage of contribu-
tions shows a sharply different relationship to size of company from
the one reported above. Corporations in the lowest asset size classes
show extremely low giving rates, and the rate is generally higher for
the larger corporations than for the smaller. It rises progressively
from the smallest size classes to the $5- to $50-million asset range,
and then falls off somewhat for the largest asset size classes.
Another kind of bias could arise from the fact that smaller corpora-
tions typically might employ relatively more labor than large ones.
Corporate profits, which mainly represent payment for the services of
capital, might thus represent a smaller part of total factor payments
for small than for large corporations. If giving is based on total factor
payments or on the total activity of the corporation, it would be a
higher percentage of income (the payment to capital) for small cor-
porations. If one were to express the contributions of corporations
Joseph L. McConnell, Earnings By Size of Firm," Survey of Cur-
rent Business, Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, May, 1945, pp. 6—12.64 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
as a percentage of their payments to all factors of production (not
just to capital), then one might observe a different relationship be-
tween giving rate and size.
The evidence suggests that there indeed may be a different rela-
tionship. Giving measured against total corporate activity rises as
corporate size increases. Taking a corporation's gross sales as the meas-
ure of its total activity, Column 10 of Table 15 shows that contribu-
tions as a percentage of gross sales are generally higher for larger
corporations than for smaller.27 The giving rate, thus measured, rises
regularly from the smallest corporations to those in the $10- to
$50-million asset range and then falls off a little for those having
more than $50 million in assets. Using sales as the measure of size,
one could say that, as a general rule, the larger the corporation, the
more "generous" it is.
The multiple correlation analysis provides another means for iden-
tifying the relationship of size to giving. To answer the question
whether the giving percentage is higher for large than for small cor-
porations, we shall seek to determine the scale elasticity of corporate
giving. If an elasticity of less than 1 is found, then, other things being
equal, a 10 per cent increase in size would mean a less than 10 per
cent increase in giving and could be interpreted as evidence that large
corporations give proportionately less than small ones. On the other
hand, if an elasticity of more than 1 is found, this could be interpreted
as evidence that large corporations give proportionately more than
small ones.
As in the time-series analysis, the scale variable used in the regres-
sions is income. However, the scale effect represents the relationship
between giving and corporate size, assuming that other factors, par-
ticularly the rate of return on investment, are held constant. In this
analysis, therefore, the scale effect is measured by assuming equi-
proportionate changes in income and investment, investment here
measured by net worth. Thus the scale elasticity is measured as the
sum of the income and net-worth coefficients, holding the number of
corporations constant. In equations C and D of Table 14, the elasticity
is 0.6 to 0.7.
The reasons this may be an understatement were given earlier;
A stronger case might be made for measuring contributions relative to
value added rather than sales, since value added is a more direct measure of a
corporation's separate contribution to economic output. Unfortunately the In-
ternal Revenue Service data are not classified in ways which permit the computa-
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namely, the income variable is affected by the composition of officers'
compensation, which varies with the size of the corporation. Since the
average size of corporations varied widely among the industries used
in the cross-sectional analysis, some allowance was made for this
effect by including data on officers compensation in the correlation as
a separate variable. On a simple correlation basis, as shown in Appen-
dix D, it was positively correlated with each of the other variables in
the analysis, and so its influence would be indirectly reflected in the
regression coefficients of other variables.
In the multiple regression equations E and F, the beta coefficients
of the officers' compensation variable were negative. This deserves
some explanation. The figures in Table 15 suggest that the compo-
nent of officers' compensation representing return on capital, rather
than payment for labor services, declined rather sharply as corporate
size increased. The table also suggests that, as one rises through suc-
cessively larger corporate size classes, the pure salary component of
officers' compensation probably increases somewhat less than in pro-
portion to corporate size. Presumably the level of compensation for in-
dividual officers is subject to greater limitations than the size to which
companies can grow. Multiple regression techniques were used to
take into account these biases in the gross measure of officers' com-
pensation and so provide a better measure of the effects of size, in-
come, and other factors. The negative beta coefficient suggests that
the regression techniques accomplished what they were intended to
do.
Were it possible to measure the pure salary part of officers compen-
sation, it could show a negative relationship to giving in the multiple
equations, other variables held constant. Officers compensation is a
deduction from income, and the higher its value, for corporations of
the same size, the lower the corporation's income. Assuming equipro-
portionate changes in income, net worth, and officers' compensation,
the officers' compensation element would represent a negative com-
ponent in measuring the scale effect. It is not likely, however, that
this negative regression coefficient would be very large.
If it were possible to separate out the return-to-capital component
of the officers' compensation data, and to assign it to the income
variable, the new income variable thus created would vary much less
than the one used in the analysis. The regression coefficient for the
new income variable would therefore be higher. The combined in-
come and net-worth (i.e. scale) elasticity in equation E of Table 14 is66 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
+.784. Moreover, the size of the officers compensation coefficient
(—.591) suggests that its effect in overstating the variability in in-
come has been considerable. What the measured scale effect would
be, had it been possible to use a more precise measure of income, is
difficult to assess. However, when allowance is made for the biases
described above, the inference of a scale elasticity not far from + 1
appears to be reasonable. If so, then it is in rough agreement with that
found in the time-series analysis. That is, both findings suggest that
larger corporations are neither more nor less generous, relative to
their income, than are smaller ones.
ProfItability and Giving
One might expect that, in their allocation of funds to contributions,
corporate officials would pay particular attention to the profits per-
formance of the company, i.e., how much the company was earning
on the investment of its shareholders. The directors of a company
with a high return on investment might feel at greater liberty to dis-
tribute some profits to charitable causes than those iii a company with
a low return on investment. This is so because the high-profit com-
pany has relatively more resources available for all kinds of spending,
including philanthropic contributions. Higher contributions might
thus be acceptable to shareholders who, at the same time, may be
receiving higher dividends and observing a higher reinvestment of
earnings, with its consequences of rapid growth in the value of their
investment.
The correlation analysis of the relationship between giving and
profits presented above covered the four-year period 1954—1957. This
time period was chosen partly because it bears a reasonable opera-
tional connection to the experience of corporations. In the long run,
rates of return on investment would tend to equality in an economy
with high capital mobility, assuming no systematic relationship be-
tween long-run risk differences and giving. However, in a period of
less than five years, a measurable variation in profit rates among
companies might be expected. Such variation could be used in ex-
plaining the giving performance of companies.
The coefficients of the profits variable (X3) can be interpreted as
a measure of the responsiveness of giving to the rate of profit, i.e., the
profitability of corporations. Profitability is measured as the rate of
return on invested capital; in this analysis it is the ratio of net profitsEconomic Analysis of Corporate Giving 67
to net worth (X4). Because one of the variables included in the esti-
mating equation is net worth, the coefficient of the profits variable
reflects the change in giving when all other variables, net worth in-
cluded, are held constant. Thus a 10 per cent increase in profits, hold-
ing net worth constant, signifies a 10 per cent increase in profits as a
percentage of net worth.
The responsiveness (elasticity) of giving to profitability, as esti-
mated by the multiple equations excluding the last equation, ranges
between .42 and .52. This is roughly in accord with the low-profit-
ability elasticities suggested in the time-series analysis. As pointed out
in that examination, corporations might regard high- or low-profit
rates as essentially short-run departures from normal rates, and giv-
ing might be related more to long-run than to short-run profitability.
While the four-year period covered in the cross-sectional data is
long enough to encompass a business cycle (and thus long enough to
eliminate some of the distortion that might be found in annual data),
it is still a relatively short period—short enough to discourage either
low-profit or high-profit firms from basing their giving decisions ex-
clusively on the profit patterns observed in the period.
Employment and Giving
The number of persons engaged by a corporation may be an impor-
tant factor in the determination of the amount it decides to give. The
more employees a corporation has, the more it may feel some respon-
sibility for the welfare of the communities in which they reside. That
this has explicit recognition has been demonstrated by surveys of cor-
poration giving.28 Contributions to local community chest and hospital
drives are often based, in important part, on the percentage a com-
pany's employees represent in total community employment. Many
corporations have college scholarship programs for employees' chil-
dren, and, in a fairly recent development, some corporations have pro-
grams whereby the corporation matches employee alumni gifts to col-
leges. The changing patterns of contributions described in Chapter
Two probably reflect the development of employee-related programs to
a considerable degree, particularly in the field of corporate support of
higher education.
The hypothesis that a corporation's giving rates are positively re-
78See,e.g., Andrews, Corporation Giving, pp. 47—48, 84—85, and 114—115.68 Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
lated to the number of its employees was tested by including data on
employment in manufacturing industries (for 1954) in the multiple
correlation analysis.2°
If there were no relationship between number of employees and
giving, the coefficient of the employment variable (X5) should be
zero. If, on the other hand, the number of employees were the sole
determinant of the amount given, then one might infer that the co-
efficient of X5 would be 1. That is, if a corporation's giving were
rigidly based on a fixed number of dollars per employee, one would
observe giving to rise in direct proportion to employment.
The observed coefficient of the employment variable is positive
and significantly greater than zero (+.270). This value predicts that
a corporation with 10 per cent more employees than another having
the same dimensions in all other respects (size, profits, officers' com-
pensation) will give 2.7 per cent more in contributions. The coeffi-
cient thus provides some notion of the importance of the number of
employees in a corporation's giving. Accounting for a 27-per-cent part
of what would be a fully proportionate response, it must be numbered
among the more important factors determining a corporation's giving
level.
Dividends and Giving
The contributions of a corporation represent a distribution of its
earnings to persons and institutions other than its shareholders. The
benefits to the company and its shareholders of these gifts is often in-
direct and possibly long deferred. Therefore, in the context of imme-
diate and measurable gain, a company's contributions are a subtrac-
tion from the shareholders' claim on its earnings. This, of course, is
not always so. In many cases, the gain to the company and ultimately
to the shareholders far outweighs the cost of the gift. For example,
corporate support of hospitals in communities in which a large pro-
Industryemployment data came from the Bureau of the Census, whereas
data on corporate profits, net worth, contributions, etc. came from the Internal
Revenue Service. The two sets of data are not wholly comparable, as the Census
data are based on the manufacturing establishments classified in the given in-
dustry group, while the Internal Revenue Service data are based on companies.
Where a company has a number of establishments, some falling in one industry
group and some in others, the Internal Revenue Service assigns it to the industry
group of greatest activity. Neither the degree nor the direction of the bias intro-
duced into the present analysis from this source is known. However, it is likely
to be small, as the industry groups are quite broad, and the number of companies
having operations in more than one group—operations which account for a
significant part of the activities of each of the several groups—is likely to be few.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 69
portion of residents work in the company's plant may so reduce costs
of labor absenteeism, for health reasons, as to more than repay the
cost of supporting the hospital. And, indeed, much of the judicial
support of the legality of corporate giving is based on the argument
that the corporation does in some sense realize some value from the
gifts it makes, and this undoubtedly has much influence on corporate
giving policies.
In addition, the extent to which contributions reduce dividends
may be operationally insignificant. Contributions represent only a
minor fraction of corporate earnings distributions—for all corpora-
tions less than 3 per cent of dividends and contributions combined
(Table 16, column 4). The percentage varies considerably among the
major industrial sectors, but in no sector is it more than 11 per cent.
Moreover, some of the larger percentages may reflect the inadequacy
of the dividend data in describing the distribution of earnings. The
sectors having the three largest percentages are construction, trade,
and services, in which the average corporation size is small. As was
shown earlier, smaller companies more commonly tend to distribute
earnings as part of officers compensation and place less emphasis on
dividend distributions. To the degree that officers compensation rep-
resents a distribution of profit rather than a pure payment for serv-
ices, gifts as a per cent of gifts plus dividends the impor-
tance of gifts in total distributions of earnings.
To demonstrate this bias, gifts have been expressed as a percentage
of the total of dividends, officers compensation, and gifts (Table 16,
column 5). This of course is an overadjustment, as much of the offi-
cers compensation is true payment for services. However, there was
no feasible way of separating out the "dividend component" of officers
compensation. Even though the percentage of gifts to total distribu-
tions of earnings is now understated, the percentages for the various
industrial sectors are more comparable. The percentages for construc-
tion, trade, and services are now the same general size as the other
groups, and the relative variation among sectors is much lower. On
the broader definition, therefore, the substitution of contributions for
dividends is on the order of about 2 per cent of dividends.
In the multiple correlation analysis presented in Table 14, an at-
tempt was made to directly determine the effect on contributions of
dividend payments. This was done by including dividends as one of
the explanatory variables (Equation F). The appearance of the divi-
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profits and net worth variables, and noticeable changes in the other
variables. Whereas the coefficients of equations having successively
more variables up to this point had appeared to evolve in a rather or-
derly manner, the introduction of dividends drastically reordered
the estimating equation. The observed estimating coefficient of the
dividend variable was very high (+.709).
Two interpretations of this pattern present themselves. The first is
that the influence of dividends is clearly of a lower order of magnitude
than scale of operations and profitability. If so, then the observed
change assigning more influence to dividends is primarily statistical.
The intercorrelations between dividends and income (scale) is high
(+.871), as is that between dividends and net worth (+.885). When
dividends were added to the equation it was therefore the idiosyn-
crasies of multicollinearity, rather than the discovery of a significant
new explanatory variable, that produced the change.
The second interpretation is that, considered in their short-run
operational context, the dividend and contributions decisions are
likely to produce parallel short-run changes in these two distributions
of corporate income. Corporate managements may be reluctant to in-
crease contributions if, at the same time, they decide not to increase
dividends. While it is true that contributions amount to only 2 or 3
per cent of dividends, management may fear some loss of stockholder
good will if it became known that contributions were increased while
dividends were not. Although both distributions are primarily deter-
mined by longer-run factors, in a cross-sectional, short-run compari-
son, the parallel movements in the two, for the reasons cited above,
might assign to dividends a more pervasive causal significance than
they actually have.
The qualitative evidence on this issue is mixed. In his survey of
shareholder attempts to limit contributions by corporations, John H.
Watson III found that
The vast majority of stockholders approve the practice—at least by de-
fault—since relatively few either endorse or complain about manage-
ment's decision. But those who do complain are usually aggressive in
stating their disapproval. They demand and get management atten-
tion... Onbalance, however, the playback from stockholders praises
company contributions.
Watson qualifies his review, however, in the following way:
But despite the present success of corporate management in adminis-
tering the company's contribution policy to the satisfaction of all butEconomic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving
a minority of its stockholders, every management acknowledges it
must be cautious in exercising control. For no one responding to the
NICB survey ruled out the possibility that less prosperous times might
bring challenges from more formidable stockholders.3°
SUMMARY
The effects of the scale of corporate operations could be measured
using both time-series and cross-sectional data. Both analyses esti-
mated a scale elasticity of close to +1. This suggests that, by virtue
of size alone, large corporations give neither more, nor less, in pro-
portion to their size than do small ones.
The correlation analyses based on time-series data suggested that
the price elasticity of giving had a value of close to —1. Price was
here measured as the complement of the marginal tax rate, and so
represented the after-tax cost of $1 in giving. The observed elasticity
suggested that the immediate and certain tax reduction that results
from contributions was a significant factor in the giving decision.
This was plausible, particularly when the assessment of the other
benefits from contributions must necessarily be very uncertain.
The analysis assigned considerable significance to the growth in
corporate giving propensity, i.e., to an increased and more widespread
acceptance of its legality, appropriateness, and worth. After taking
separate account of price and scale effects, progressive changes in the
effects of other factors, of which the change in giving propensity was
judged to be the most important, were found to be very significant.
Changes in other factors, thus measured, accounted for a more than
300 per cent increase in gifts and contributions (constant dollars)
over the twenty-seven-year period 1936—1963.
Both the time-series and the cross-sectional analyses suggested a
rather low degree of responsiveness of giving to changes in the rate of
return on shareholders investment (profitability). The finding seemed
plausible. Corporations might regard periods of high or low profit
rates as temporary, and might, therefore, relate giving to their longer-
run profit rates. Probably more important in the immediate operational
context, giving might be most directly related to the absolute amount
of income as, for example, it is under the tax regulations. If so, con-
siderations of rate of return are a step removed from the central de-
cision variables.
"CorporateContributions Policy," The Conference Board Record, National
Industrial Conference Board, June, 1967, pp. 12—14.Economic Analysis of Corporate Giving 73
The relationship between giving and employment was measured,
using cross-sectional data. The correlation analysis found a signifi-
cant association between the relative degree to which corporations
used labor in production and the level of giving. Prior examination of
giving patterns had found much of corporate giving to be employee-
related. Contributions to community fund drives are frequently based
on quotas determined by the number of the company's employees in
the community. More recently, educational grants for employees and
their children have received increased emphasis.
Finally, the cross-sectional analysis brought out a significant asso-
ciation between contributions and dividend payments. Probably both
forms of corporate income distribution reflect a common cause,
namely the income (or scale of activity) on which they are both
based. However, the degree of the association suggests a possibly sig-
nificant degree of short-run interrelationship.Possibly corporate
management would not feel justified in increasing contributions with
no concurrent increase in dividends. This, despite the fact that con-
tributions represent only 2 or 3 per cent of dividend payments.